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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
under compulsion of judgment as provided by RCW 71.32.300, or after interpleading
conflicting claimants as provided by RCW 4.08.150, the garnishee may be later required
to pay a second time to a claimant of the debt who was not made a party to the gar-
nishment proceeding. "When a writ of garnishment is served upon a garnishee, it casts
upon him the responsibility of protecting his interests." He can do this only if he pays
under compulsion of judgment or interpleads conflicting claimants as provided by the
statutes.
CRIMINAL LAW
Equivocal Plea of Guilty. In State v. Rose1 the defendant, charged
with first degree assault, entered a plea of guilty, but when asked, some
minutes later, if he had anything to say on his behalf, replied, "I would
like to make it clear I didn't fire the pistol at anybody with intentions
to hit them." While noting that intent is an element of the crime
charged, the court held the plea was a bona fide plea of guilty. State v.
Stacy2 came up to the court later in the year. The defendant, also
charged with first degree assault, answered the court's question of plea,
saying, "I plead guilty to that charge .... I would like to make a state-
ment to that charge. Even though I am pleading guilty to that charge
it is a lie on my part. I am doing so on advice of counsel." He made
a similar statement a few moments later, adding that he was so pleading
"on the advice of my wife." The court held that the trial court erred
in accepting the plea without first eliminating the equivocation.
All guilty pleas should be considered against the background of
certain general principles. The plea entered by the defendant must be
guilty or not guilty or former jeopardy or acquittal.' The plea of
guilty should be entirely voluntary by one competent to know the
consequences and not induced by fear, apprehension, persuasion,
promises, inadvertance or ignorance.4 A plea of guilty admits all the
elements of the crime charged.5 One of the maxims resulting from an
amalgamation of these general principles is that the crucial test of a
trial court's action in accepting a plea of guilty is whether the defendant
entered his plea of guilty freely and understandingly, whether he readily
understood that he was admitting the commission of the acts consti-
142 Wn.2d 509, 256 P.2d 497 (1953).
-143 Wash. Dec. 331, 261 P.2d 400 (1953).
3 RCW 10.40.150
4 Ortigas v. State, 140 Fla. 671, 192 So. 795 (1940) ; Bennett v. State, 75 Okl. Cr.
42 (1942) ; Pennington v. Smith, 35 Wn.2d 267, 212 P.2d 811 (1949).
People v. Mendietta, 100 Cal. App.2d 763, 226 P.2d 812 (1951); Cummings v.
Perry, 194 Ga. 424, 21 S.E. 2d 847 (1942) ; Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wn.2d 155, 160 P.2d
529 (1945).
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tuting the offense charged.6
When the facts in the Stacy case are examined with these principles
in mind the court's conclusion is the only plausible one. Stacy's pro-
testation of innocence at the same time as his confession of guilt could
hardly be viewed as a plea of guilty. Stacy had a history of neurotic
disturbances which should have signalled the need for the trial court
to determine the defendant's competence and to ascertain his under-
standing of the plea, and the presence or absence of volition. Rationali-
zation of the court's conclusion in the earlier Rose case is not so simple.
Rose's denial of commission of the crime as charged came some minutes
after the plea. Rose, like Stacy, had originally entered a plea of not
guilty. The court's language in denying the defendant's claim of
equivocal plea is enlightening:
After appellant had orally announced his plea, the court requested that the
record show that appellant had withdrawn the plea of not guilty and en-
tered a plea of guilty. What thereafter transpired had nothing to do with
the entry of appellant's plea. That act had been completed. The statement
which appellant made regarding his lack of criminal intent was offered while
the court was seeking information to assist it in fixing the sentence. The
court apparently discounted the truth of this statement, perhaps believing
that it was offered only for the purpose of obtaining leniency and not to
disavow the new plea of guilty which had just been entered. The failure of
the appellant or his counsel to then request a withdrawal of the plea of guilty
tended to substantiate such a conclusion. 7 (Emphasis added.)
To support its position the court cited People ex rel. Hubert v. Kaiser8
which appears similar on its facts. The New York court rejected the
argument that the plea was invalid. The defendant contended that
answers given the court after the plea should have indicated to the
court that he had not pleaded guilty with full understanding. Neither
the answers nor the questions of' the court are clear from the report of
the case. Such vagueness makes the case questionable in its application
to the Rose situation where the substance of the colloquy was very
important.
Although the plea of guilty admits all the elements of the crime
charged9 Rose denied an important element. He must certainly have
misunderstood the full meaning of his plea. The fact that the trial court
"apparently discounted the truth of this statement" is the very issue
0 Crooks v. State, 214 Ind. 505, 15 N. E. 2d. 359 (1938) ; Loucks v. State, 212 Ind.
108, 11 N. E. 2d 694 (1938).
742 Wn2d 509, 515; 256 P.2d 497, 504 (1953).8206 N.Y. 46, 99 N. E. 195 (1912).
9 Note 5 supra.
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in question. Should this statement have been discounted? Is the trial
court free to discount such statements at its discretion? The Washing-
ton court seems to place the emphasis on the "measure of equivocation"
and not on the existence of equivocation. The court said in the Stacy
case, distinguishing the Rose case, "In the Rose case, we decided that
a valid plea of guilty had been entered, despite some measure of equivo-
cation, and we noted that the equivocal matter wherein the defendant
asserted innocence had come in after the plea and was offered in the
hope of reducing the severity of the sentence."'" Note that the court
interprets the statement of the defendant in the Rose case as an asser-
tion of innocence not just a statement "regarding lack of criminal
intent." The only clear distinctions between the cases appears to be
the time period between the assertion of innocence and the plea and
the "measure of equivocation." Are these the criteria for determining
whether the plea of guilty is too equivocal? So it appears. Perhaps
the matter is one which should be left to the discretion of the trial court
limited only by a manifest abuse of that discretion as is the case where
the question involves permission to change the plea.1
Whatever the test in Washington the result should be, as the court
in the Stacy case said, the protection of the defendant's right to an
opportunity to establish his innocence in a trial before a jury. Such a
liberal test "obviates a collateral attack on a judgment ... by a later
claim that the plea was too equivocal to bind the pleader .... I.-' The
unequivocal position of the Washington court on the general subject
of pleading should be perpetuated.18
Obtaining Money by False Pretenses - Misrepresentation of
'Architects Fees.' In State v. Emerson, ", the defendant building con-
tractor was convicted of larceny by false pretenses when he retained
part of a sum earmarked for the payment of 'architect's fees.' He ac-
cepted the money on contracts under which he was to furnish architect's
blueprints. Two-hundred and fifty dollars was the sum to be paid for
architect's fees, and, according to the architect's testimony, was his
10 143 Wash. Dec. 331, 336, 261 P.2d 400, 403 (1953) (italics added).
11 State v. Wood, 200 Wash. 37, 93 P.2d 294 (1939) ; State v. Hensley, 20 Wn.2d
95, 145 P.2d 1014 (1944).
12 143 Wash. Dec. 331, 335, 261 P.2d 400, 403 (1953).
13 "Under the statutes of this state and the decisions of this court no person informed
against or indicted for a crime shall be convicted thereof except by admitting the truth
of the charge in his plea, by confession in open court or by the verdict of a jury, accepted
and recorded by the court." (Emphasis added.) State v. Williams, 30 Wn2d 18, 22,
190 P.2d 734, 737 (1948) and cases cited.
14 143 Wash. Dec. 4, 259 P.2d 406 (1953).
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charge for the plans; but the defendant, by agreement with the archi-
tect and unknown to his clients, was allowed to keep $100 because he
had obtained other business for the architect and provided some small
amount of work toward. the completion of the blueprints. The prose-
cuting witnesses received the blueprints. Although they testified that
it was their understanding that no part of the money paid initially was
to accrue to the defendant, the only false representation charged to
the jury was exaggeration of the architect's costs."' On appeal the
conviction was upheld, six to three, the majority holding that the de-
fendant's statement that the 'architect's fees' were $250, when the
architect received only $150, was a false representation.
False pretenses as generally understood is obtaining the property
of another by an intentional false statement concerning a material
matter of fact in reliance on which the title or possession of property
is parted with." All the elements are clearly present in the instant
case, with the only question involved being the false representation
itself. Since the issue was limited to whether or not the defendant
"falsely exaggerated the architect's costs" attention is immediately
focused on the definition of terms. What is meant by 'architect's fees'
or 'architect's costs' in the factual context of the instant case? If the
term meant the money to be paid to the architect, exclusive of any
kick-backs to the contractor, then the defendant's representation of
the fees or costs was unquestionably false. If the term meant the
charge of the architect, regardless of his disbursal of the sum, then the
representation was not false. The jury apparently interpreted the facts
to bear the former definition.
17
One of the major arguments of the dissent requires special attention.
In the instant case the prosecuting witnesses obtained the blueprints
15The trial judge said: "... unless this man is guilty of obtaining the money
originally by the false representation of exaggerating the amount of tho architect's
costs, that he wouldn't be guilty of anything. . . . The case will go to the jury..,.
on the sole theory of misrepresentation, falsely exaggerating the architect's costs.'
Ibid, 143 Wash. Dec. at 16, 259 P.2d at 414.
'aState v. Swan, 55 Wash. 97, 104 Pac. 145 (1909); People v. Jordan, 66 Cal. App.
10, 4 Pac. 773 (1884) ; People v. Oris, 52 Colo. 244, 121 Pac. 163 (1912).1 7 0On the point of evidence to support the facts the majority and dissent seenm to
differ in their interpretation of the trial record. Bearing on what 'architect's fees'
meant the majority considers the testimony that it was understood no part of the down
payment was to go to the defendant. "He told them that all he was to realize was the
$50 per week for the supervision and that no part of the down payments were (.Sic)
to go to him personally; that included in the down payment was the sum of $250 for
architect's fees." 143 Wash. Dec. at 11, 259 P2d at 411. The dissent stated that "...
the court eliminated that part of the evidence . . ." dealing with the understanding of
the prosecuting witnesses that no part of the money was to go to the defendant. 143
Wash. Dec. at 16, 259 P2d at 413.
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they bargained for. Noting this, the dissent said:
In a case of this kind where one claims that in bargaining with another false
representations are made by which he is induced to part with money, he is
not cheated or defrauded in the sense contemplated by the statute if he gets
in exchange that for which he bargained. In re Rudebeck, 95 Wash. 433,
163 Pac. 930; State v. Sargent, 2 Wn.2d 190, 97 P.2d 692, and text authority
cited therein.' 8
Such a rule was not stated in the Rudebeck case. There the court was
addressing itself to the statement in some of the cases that the owner
must have been actually defrauded; it said:
But this expression does not imply that he must have suffered actual pecuni-
ary loss ... The owner is actually defrauded when he parts with his property
or money and fails to receive in exchange that for which he bargained.' 9
The Sargent court cited this passage, then cited text authority to the
effect that "as a rule the crime is not committed if the prosecutor gets
out of the transaction just what he bargained for."2 This was followed
by the statement upon which the dissent in the instant case based its
rule: "It will be noted that it is pointed out in both of the foregoing
quotations that a crime is not committed if the person from whom the
property is obtained gets in exchange what he bargained for."'21 One
of the defenses in the Sargent case was that there had been no allegation
that the prosecuting witness was defrauded in the sense of suffering
any pecuniary loss, so the information was vitiated. The above-quoted
passage from In re Rudebeck was cited in response to this argument.
The defendant in the Sargent case argued that the prosecuting witness
obtained what he bargained for, thus the crime had not been com-
mitted; the court decided he had not obtained what he bargained for.
It appears the Sargent court recognized this 'bargained for' principle
as a good defense, but under the facts of that case there was no holding
on this precise question. The majority in the instant case made no
mention of the Sargent case and its 'bargained for' rule; this could
possibly mean the majority views the 'rule' as actually dicta.
Two final observations should be made. The fact of the defendant's
silence about retaining a part of the sum paid is an aspect of the case
not dealt with by either the dissent or majority. It has been contended
that mere silence or suppression of the truth or a mere withholding of
is 143 Wash. Dec. at 20, 259 P.2d at 416.
19 In re Rudebeck, 95 Wash. 433 at 440, 163 Pac. 930 at 933 (1917).
20 25 C.J. 608, False Pretenses § 39 (1921).
21 State v. Sargent, 2 Wn.2d 190 at 194, 97 P.2d 692 at 694 (1940).
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knowledge on which another may act is not sufficient to constitute false
pretenses,2 but this may be qualified by the rule that the suppression of
a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of
other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication, is
a false representation. " If the "exaggeration of the architect's costs"
is viewed from the standpoint of considering it a failure on the part
of the defendant to disclose that part of those costs included kick-backs
to him these principles would bear examination and possible applica-
tion.
From the interpretation of 'architect's fees' in this case there may,
in the future, be some dangers involved in the use of such terms in
business dealings. Situations in which the contractor, or businessman
in a similar position, has kick-back arrangements could be productive
of criminal prosecution where the customer discovers the arrangements
and, unsatisfied with the transaction as a whole, decides to be
vindictive.2
Obtaining Money by False Pretenses-Check Obtained in One
County and Deposited in Another-Venue. In State v. Phillips,"5 the
defendant deposited in his bank in Kittitas county a check obtained
by false pretenses in Yakima county. He was charged with obtaining
'a specific amount of money' by false pretenses. Tried and convicted
in Kittitas county, he argued lack of jurisdiction on the ground that
the gravamen of the offense was the obtaining of the check and that
venue would properly lie only in Yakima county. The court held that
the crime was complete when the defendant deposited the check in
his bank. Following the general rule that the crime of obtaining money
or property by false pretenses is completed when the money or property
is obtained,"6 the court concluded that he had obtained the money when
he received what the court called an 'immediate credit.' The court
stated that under the statute covering crimes committed partly in one
county and partly in another county ' this case could be tried in either
county.
22 McCorkle v. State, 170 Ark. 105, 278 S.W. 965 (1926) ; Stumpff v. People, 51
Colo. 202, 117 Pac. 134 (1911). (non-disclosure of mortgages on property sold).
23 People v. Mace, 71 Cal. App. 10, 234 Pac. 841 (1925); People v. Etzler, 292
Mich. 489, 290 N.W. 879 (1940) ; Montez v. People, 110 Colo. 20, 132 P.2d 970 (1943).
The court in the last case referred to a "positive course of affirmative falsity."
24 In the instant case the victims prosecuted after they discovered they could not
obtain the loans to go ahead with construction.
25 42 Wn.2d 137, 253 P.2d 919 (1953).
2622 C.J.S., Crim. Law, § 185 (1940).
27 RCW 10.25.020.
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The cases involving a check obtained by false pretenses fall generally
into two categories: those in which the defendant cashes the check and
those in which he deposits the check to his account. In the instant case
the court followed a North Dakota case,"8 and the cases cited therein,
in which the defendant cashed the check. Notwithstanding the ques-
tion of when the check is actually paid so far as the drawer is con-
cerned29 these cases reasoned that in cashing the check the defendant
obtained the money. Recognizing the general rule,"0 the courts in these
cases held that venue would lie in the county in which the check was
cashed.
In cases where the defendant deposits the check to his account as in
instant case, it has been held that venue lies where the check is charged
to the account of the drawer." The cases in this category follow the
reasoning that when the drawer's account is charged for the check the
payee (defendant in the cases) obtains the money unconditionally at
that time and place. Until the drawer's account is charged he may
prevent the payee from receiving unconditional credit by stopping pay-
ment, unless certification is a factor." However, in Washington it is
still possible to argue that venue will lie in the county in which the
defendant-depositor's bank is located. Under the Bank Collection Code
the depository bank is ordinarily the depositor's agent for collection.3
Acting in such a capacity, the bank, in effect, 'transports' the proceeds
of the item for collection from the drawee bank to the payee's account
in the depository bank. Within the general principles of agency the
payee has 'transported' the proceeds. When stolen property is taken
from one county into another county jurisdiction is in either county
and venue will so lie.34 Thus, on the facts of the instant case venue
will lie in the county where the defendant deposited the check but not
necessarily for the reasons stated in the cases cited by the court. In
State v. Moore3" the court used much the same reasoning as suggested
here. In that case the defendant deposited a check drawn on a Montana
28 State v. Hastings, 77 N. D. 146, 41 N. W. 2d 305 (1950).
29 BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 262 (1943).
30 Note 26, supra.
3' State v. Mandell, 353 Mo. 502, 183 S.W. 2d 59 (1949) ; accord, Raymond v. State,
116 Tex. Cr. 595, 33 S. W. 2d 192 (1930).
32 BRIrON, op. cit. supra note 5, § 181.
$a RCW 30.52.020.
34 RCW 10.25.040. It should be noted that the constitutionality of this statute has
been questioned where applied to an indictment for burglary, although this point has
not been raised as to its application in the case of larceny. State v. Carroll, 55 Wash.
588, 104 Pac. 814 (1909).
35 189 Wash. 680, 66 P.2d 836 (1937).
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bank in a Washington bank and the statute covering inter-state trans-
porting of stolen property was applied.8"
While the court's conclusion in the instant case is correct the applica-
tion of the cases cited by the court may be open to question.
Automobile Theft-Punishment . In In re Macduff87 the petitioner
pleaded guilty to a charge of taking a motor vehicle without permission
of the owner, in violation of RCW 9.54.020. The sentence was im-
prisonment for a period of not more than 20 years. The statute defines
the crime, makes it a felony and provides no penalty. The petitioner
claimed his term of confinement could not legally exceed 10 years as
provided by RCW 9.92.010.8 The court held the sentence imposed to
be correct under RCW 9.95.010.11 The former applies to "every person
convicted of a felony for which no punishment is specially prescribed
" The latter applies "if the law does not provide a maximum term
for the crime .. "
In State v. Mulcare" the defendant was convicted of attempted
robbery for which a penalty is fixed with relation to the penalty for
robbery." The robbery statute provides no maximum.' 2 In State v.
Seabrands" the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted rape. The
applicable statutes provide for penalty but no maximum." In State v.
McVeigh' the defendant was convicted of attempted arson. Here
again the statutes provide for penalty but no maximum."6 In each of
these cases RCW 9.95.010 was applied rather than RCW 9.92.010.
These three cases were cited to support the court's position in the
instant case. The statute under which the petitioner in the instant case
was prosecuted provides no penalty,.' either minimum or maximum.
If RCW 9.95.010 does not render 9.92.010 inapplicable it would
80 RCW 9.54.010.
87 42 Wn.2d 488, 256 P.2d 293 (1953).
8 "Every person convicted of a felony for which no punishment is specially pre-
scribed by a statutory provision in force at the time of conviction and sentence, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten years, or by a
fine of not more than five thousand dollars."So'" If the law does not provide a maximum term for the crime of which such
person ('a person convicted of any felony, except treason, murder in the first degree,
or carnal knowledge of a child under ten years... ') was convicted the court shall
fix such maximum term at not less than twenty years."
40 189 Wash. 625, 66 P.2d 360 (1937).
41 RCW 9.01.070. Attempts, how punished.
42 RCW 9.75.010.
43 191 Wash. 472, 71 P.2d 393 (1937).
44 RCW 9.79.010. Rape defined. Note 41, jupra.
45 35 Wn.2d 493, 214 P.2d 165 (1950).
40 RCW 9.09.010. Arson-First degree. Note 41, supra.
47 RCW 9.54.020.
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appear that the contention of the petitioner has some merit. The
opinion of the Attorney General in 1946 supports the petitioner's
position."8
SAMUEL F. PEARcE
Criminal Law-Sodomy-Penetration Whether penetration is necessary to constitute
the crime of sodomy was decided for the first time in Washington in State v. Olsen,
42 Wn.2d 733, 258 P.2d 810 (1953). With proof of penetration lacking, the court
reversed the conviction. This is the general rule. The court pointed out that the
defendant could have been charged under the indecent liberties statute (RCW 9.79.080),
and the proof would have been sufficient.
Agreement with Wife as Defense to Crime of Non-Support. In State v. Prince, 42
Wn.2d 314, 254 P.2d 731 (1953), the defendant was charged with the crime of non-
support under RCW 26.20.030. As a complete defense he offered to prove an agreement
with his wife that he would not be expected to support the children. It was held that
to support this defense, the defendant must have proved that his wife agreed to support
the children, that she had sufficient means for that purpose, and that he relied upon
that agreement in good faith.
Bribery-Applcation of Statute-Interpretation of "Upon Agreement and Under-
standing." In State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 1, 252 P.2d 386 (1953), the defendant
secretary of the state land board was convicted under RCW 9.18.020 of soliciting a
bribe. Since the statute providing for his office specifies no official duties, the defendant
contended there were, in the words of the bribery statute, no "matters then pending,"
so he could not and did not influence the sale of timber lands within the meaning of
the statute. He further argued that there was no testimony of an "agreement or under-
standing" as required by the bribery statute; and thus, the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict. Held, First, the bribery statute does not limit the crime to instances
in which official duties are prescribed by statute; it is sufficient if the state officer,
agent or employee is given official duties by direction of his superiors or by customary
practice. Second, the provision of the bribery statute that the crime of asking a bribe,
"upon an agreement or understanding" that the official's acts will be influenced thereby,
does not require an understanding in the sense of an agreement with the person
approached, but merely an understanding on the part of the bribe seeker himself that
his official action shall be influenced. Evidence of such understanding and its communi-
cation to the person approached is sufficient within the meaning of the statute.
DAMAGES
Award of Nominal Damages after Finding of Substantial Damage
-Duty of Trial Judge. In Gilmartin v. Stevens Investment Co.' the
plaintiffs had purchased from defendant a tract of land under contract
of tale, and had built a house on the property. Defendant agreed by
the contract to furnish an adequate water supply to the land, which
48 Surveying the statutes in question in the instant case the Attorney General said,
.. it is the opinion of this office that a person convicted of the crime of taking a
motor vehicle without permission may not be sentenced to be punished by confinement
... for a maximum term in excess of ten years." 46 OAG 774 (1946).
1 143 Wash. Dec. 267, 261 P.2d 73 (1953).
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